



CH II

The Revelation of DANIEL

Overview of Ch 11



- V1-4 The division of Alexander's kingdom
- V5-29 The Seleucid – Ptolemaic wars in relation to natural Israel
- V30-35 The war against spiritual Israel
- V36-45 The Little Horn's religious policy and military conquests
 - In its “Christian” Roman phase (V36-39)
 - In its Russian phase (V40-45)

Breakup of Ch 11:40-45



V40-45 The Little Horn's military conquests in its Russian phase

- V40 Russia conquers Turkey*
- V41 Russia overpowers Israel
- V42-43 Russia conquers Egypt
- V44 Russia conquers British opposition#
- V45 Russia is defeated by the Prince of Princes

* The King of the North becomes the Little Horn

The standing up of the "image-empire"

Who is the 'him' in V40?

36 And **the king** shall do according to his will; and **he** shall exalt himself, and magnify himself above every god, and shall speak marvellous things against the God of gods, and shall prosper till the indignation be accomplished: for that that is determined shall be done.

37 Neither shall **he** regard the God of his fathers, nor the desire of women, nor regard any god: for **he** shall magnify himself above all.

38 But in his estate shall **he** honour the God of forces: and a god whom his fathers knew not shall **he** honour with gold, and silver, and with pre-

cious stones, and pleasant things.

39 Thus shall **he** do in the most strong holds with a strange god, whom **he** shall acknowledge and increase with glory: and **he** shall cause them to rule over many, and shall divide the land for gain.

40 And at the time of the end shall the king of the south push at **him**: and the king of the north shall come against him like a whirlwind, with chariots, and with horsemen, and with many ships; and he shall enter into the countries, and shall overflow and pass over.

Where is the throne of the 'king' in V36?

1. The Goat of Ch 8 represents the Grecian empire. This empire extended eastwards from Greece. (It did not encompass Europe).
2. Therefore the throne of the Little Horn that came out of the *Greek* goat must be centred in the east.
3. In its *first* phase the Little Horn was the Roman military power throned in Constantinople.
4. Therefore it follows that in its *second* phase the Little Horn will be the a military power also throned in Constantinople.



The King of the South shall push at him

1917

Ottoman Empire



- Britain became King of the South when it took Egypt from the Ottoman in 1882.
- In 1911 Italy took Libya from the Ottoman.
- In 1917/1918 the British pushed the Ottoman ("him") out of Palestine.

Russia's WWI grab for Constantinople was thwarted



The area to be ceded to Russia under the Constantinople Agreement of March 1915



Who is the King of the North (Dan 11:40)

	Ezekiel 38 (Prince of Rosh)	Daniel 11 (King of North)
Israel experiences storm-like invasion	V9	V40
from the north	V15	V40
in “latter days”	V16	10:14
by a heavily militarized force	V4	V40
including Ethiopia and Libya	V5	V43
The confederacy shall encounter opposition	V13	V44
And be destroyed	39:4	V45

The ‘king of the North’ is Russia

The hallmark of the 4th beast



The 4th beast is the *allied* dominion exercised by Rome and Constantinople.


When we see the religious power in Rome, confederate with the military power in Constantinople, then the time of the end is near.

The Middle East just prior to the invasion of Israel

Note: This map only shows the status of territories mentioned in Daniel 11.



Edom, Moab, Ammon



Biblical Ethiopia is modern Sudan and Ethiopia

Modern Ethiopia



Ancient Ethiopia


Proof that ancient Ethiopia bordered Egypt:

- **Ezek 29:10** says 'Egypt shall be utterly waste and desolate from Migdol to Syene, even to the border of Ethiopia'
- **Josephus, 'Wars of the Jews' 4:10.5** says Egypt 'hath on the west the dry deserts of Libya; and on the south Syene, that divides it from Ethiopia'.




At his steps

Ancient Egypt and Libya together with Persia will be “at his (Russia’s) steps”. They will be confederate with Russia rather than conquered by it.



Tidings out of the North and East

Britain has two naval bases in Cyprus with sovereign rights over the territories.



First Russia – Africa Summit, 23-24 Oct 2019



Russia and Sudan (2019)



Russia's interests in a stronger partnership with Khartoum is not just about Moscow's interests in Sudan. Moscow's agenda in Sudan must be understood within the context of **Russia's vision for its role in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and sub-Saharan Africa at large.**

TRT 19 Feb 2020

Russia and Ethiopia (2019)

“I would like to thank the Government of Russia for always standing alongside Ethiopia when it was forced to defend its independence and sovereignty. We acknowledge Russia as a key partner in our development in the world and Ethiopia wants to further strengthen this cooperation.” Prime Minister of Ethiopia



“At the beginning of our conversation, I would like to note that **Russia and Ethiopia have enjoyed very warm relations for many-many years.** The history of the diplomatic relations between our states is over 120 years long.” President of Russia

Russia and Libya (2020)



A Russian Mig-29 Fulcrum jet flying over Libya on May 26.

As in Syria, **Russia's interests in Libya** include expanding its military and political reach in the Middle East and **Mediterranean** — while also waging a proxy battle with rivals such as Turkey.

Washington Post,
June 6, 2020

The growing tension between Ethiopia and Egypt



The dam will
reduce water
flow and
electricity
generation in
Egypt by

30%

Gold in Egypt

Egypt says \$1.8 billion gold deposit found

[Cecilia Jamasmie](#) | June 30, 2020 | 7:07 pm [Exploration](#) [Markets](#) [News](#) [Africa](#) [Gold](#)



Aton Resources secured a mining license in Egypt in February — the first issued in a decade. *(Image: Camp at the Hamama gold project. Courtesy of Aton Resources.)*

Egypt's Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources revealed on Tuesday the discovery of a gold deposit with estimated resources of 1 million ounces.

Russia's naval bases

- Key Roman naval ports AD0-200
- Key Russian naval ports



Russia's red star in the Red Sea



A naval facility in Port Sudan signals a new thrust of Russian operations in the Indo-Pacific.

While the world's attention in recent weeks has been firmly fixed on the United States' presidential race, Russia under Vladimir Putin has made a number of surprising moves. One was a swift deployment of its peacekeepers to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, putting a stop for now to a bloody border war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Another move came on 16 November, when Putin approved the opening of Russia's second forward operating naval facility, this time in Sudan.

Officially described as a material-technical support facility (punkt material'no-tekhnicheskogo Obezpecheniya, or PMTO), Russia's agreement with Sudan signifies the resumption of Russia's systematic naval operations in the Indian Ocean. Such a move is significant.

Over the years, Russia has been in discussions with a number of East African nations about a possibility of reestablishing a naval logistical point. The fact that Moscow was seriously considering Sudan was first announced in late 2017. Two years later, the two countries signed a special agreement allowing special access rights to Russian warships calling on Sudanese ports.

Based on publicly available information, Russia's naval logistical point in Sudan will be considerably smaller than the Russian forward naval base in Tartus, Syria. The Russian naval base in Tartus can accommodate up to 11 warships and auxiliaries; it is now equipped with sufficient storage facilities, a repair plant and upgraded mooring spaces.

The geographical centrality of Sudan vis-à-vis the Red Sea and adjacent areas gives the Russian navy and potentially the Russian Air Space Force the capacity to control several choke points and focal areas.

The PMTO in Port Sudan (PMTO-Sudan) will be allowed to station up to four naval units simultaneously. However, the 2019 port access agreement specified that the Russian navy could deploy up to seven units in Sudan's territorial waters at any given time. This new arrangement could allow the Russian navy could assemble one or two task groups (each comprising three to four platforms) for operations in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Perhaps the most intriguing point was a clause that nuclear-powered warships would be able to access PMTO-Sudan. Given that the Russian navy currently operates two types of nuclear-powered combat platforms – the 24,000 tonne Uskov class nuclear-powered battle cruisers, reclassified from the Kirov class, and a variety of nuclear-powered multirole submarines – such a provision illustrates Russian naval planning with respect to future forward operations in the Indian Ocean area.

The agreement specifies Russia's right to use Sudanese national airspace in support of its activities. This indicates Moscow is also likely to get access to the country's airport infrastructure. Russian aerial operations may range from logistical airlift, including crew swaps, to area air defence, which presumes stationing of some fighter aircraft.

The PMTO-Sudan would be serviced by a contingent of some 300 personnel (again, a smaller number when compared against the 1700 in Tartus). But this contingent can be expanded if required. Moscow would exercise national jurisdiction over the facility; it would be responsible for its area air and maritime defence, meaning that the Russian military would be able to deploy air defence units, radar and electronic countermeasure systems; PDSS teams (the Russian equivalent of clearance divers).

View of Port Sudan (Motaz Althahir/Flickr)

Although the future PMTO-Sudan will be short of amounting to a proper naval base, there is a possibility that Russia may eventually expand its military presence in the country. Moscow could pursue a staged approach, assessing in the first instance the operational effectiveness of its newest acquisition prior to considering possible future expansion.

In return, Russia assumes responsibility for the modernisation of the Sudanese military and partial defence of air and maritime approaches to Sudan, thus effectively making this African nation Russia's military ally.

All this will carry implications for the Indo-Pacific maritime security.

Compared to similar facilities used by the Soviet navy, such as its forward operating base on Sokotra island off Yemen, Port Sudan is not ideal. Russian ships operating from a new PMTO have to navigate through volatile Bab al-Mandab Strait prior to entering the Indian Ocean. It is also worth noting that Russia faces risks associated with Sudan's ongoing internal political fragility, including hot spots in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Yet the geographical centrality of Sudan vis-à-vis the Red Sea and adjacent areas gives the Russian navy and potentially the Russian Air Space Force (the official description of now-integrated former air force, air defence and space troops) the capacity to control several choke points and focal areas: Suez Canal (also by means of Russia's reach from Tartus), the Red Sea itself as a strategically important maritime transit route, Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Gulf of Aden. Adding to that, Russia would have its military presence in Saudi Arabia's backyard and in close proximity to other Persian Gulf states. Finally, Sudan is likely to be turned into Russia's gateway into Africa, the continent, which is again on Moscow's active radar.

The future PMTO-Sudan should not be viewed solely as Russia's second naval facility overseas, and its first proper logistical point in the Indo-Pacific strategic maritime theatre. Sudan will now top a list of several Indo-Pacific littoral nations with which Russia has secured special port call privileges agreements. Others on the list include Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, Seychelles and Vietnam (where Russia had a permanent naval facility until 2002). And this expansion of Russia's access to overseas facilities comes at a time when Russian naval power continues its lengthy, often painful, but nonetheless steady process of upgrading its capability across four of its naval fleets.

Reestablishing a regular naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which goes beyond periodic counter-piracy patrols, was on the cards of the Russian naval command for some time